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ABSTRACT 
 Latin American region has transitioned to democracy in the last forty-thirty years and 
along with many policy reforms, citizen security has not been left behind. As these changes 
evolve, the relationship between internal security and the development of a stable democracy has 
acquired a great importance in terms of the factors that contribute to a free world. 
 The purpose of this research is to look at  how security policy and policing in Argentina, 
Chile, El Salvador, and Mexico have contributed to the democratization process in regards to 
how the recent reforms in law enforcement in the region have created favorable conditions 
towards democracy. First, this paper focuses on establishing the relationship between internal 
security and democratization, moving forward to the role of law enforcement in the 
demilitarization trend in the region and the world on the transition to democracy. After briefly 
covering some socio economic indicators of Latin America, this inquiry applies an original 
demilitarization scale of law enforcement to the citizen security institutions in the countries 
mentioned above. This is the first empirical measurement of law enforcement demilitarization 
for countries in Latin America. The empirical design tests whether demilitarization of internal 
security affects individuals’ diffusive democracy support and police institutions’ specific 
democratization or, on the contrary, there is no effect what so ever. The findings show support 
for the main hypothesis that individuals from countries with more demilitarized police support in 
greater scale democratic regimes; individuals from countries perceived as less corrupted were 
shown to trust police institutions greater than those from countries more corrupted; finally, 
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individuals that have had any crime interaction, whether themselves or through a relative, 
showed less trust rates in police institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Latin American region has transitioned to democracy in the last forty to thirty years and 
along with many policy reforms, citizen security has not been left behind. As well as the 
structural differences in internal security institutions, we can also find variation in the levels of 
democracy in the region. This thesis looks to answer questions such as how does performance 
and development of citizen security reforms in Latin America contribute to the democratization 
process in the region? Do the new reforms in Latin America and the transition to demilitarization 
of law enforcement in the region really contribute to citizens’ positive sentiment towards 
democratization of their country? Does demilitarization of citizen security lead to higher 
democracy levels in Latin America? 
 This issue is quiet relevant for leaders in Latin American countries considering the 
transition to democracy that the region has been through for the last forty years. The main 
argument of this thesis is that demilitarization contributes to a greater individual approval of 
democratic values. Hence, the objective is to determine whether demilitarization contributes to 
democratization of public institutions or not. The argument established in this inquiry is that 
political institutions are positively affected by law enforcement demilitarization in a smaller 
scale than individuals’ sentiments towards democratization.  
 The role that the police play in the democratization process is fundamental as new 
regimes need at least minimal levels of security and order, all these within the context of 
protecting human rights (Marenin 1996; Cruz 2011). Security and justice institutions are 
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fundamental in the development of democratic governance (Karstedt and LaFree 2006). As Latin 
American countries belong to what the literature calls third-wave democracies (Huntington, 
1991), the lack of stable and modern institutions is evident. Moreover, the social context of the 
region has made the World Bank label Latin America as the region with the highest levels of 
income inequality in the world (Hinton, 2006), creating a positive environment for criminal 
activities and high levels of insecurity. Income inequality provokes individuals’ discontent 
motivating or unconstraining them to participate in violent acts (Patterson, 1991) since crime 
could work as a balance tool to those who lack of means to accomplish success (Merton, 1938). 
 This research looks to understand how security policy and policing in Argentina, Chile, 
El Salvador, and Mexico have contributed to the democratization process in regards to how the 
recent reforms in law enforcement in the region have created favorable conditions towards 
democracy. This paper focuses first on establishing the relationship between internal security and 
democratization to move forward to the role of law enforcement in the demilitarization trend in 
the region and the world on the transition to democracy. This is the first empirical measurement 
of law enforcement demilitarization for countries in Latin America. After briefly covering some 
socio economic indicators of Latin America, this inquiry applies a militarization of law 
enforcement scale to the citizen security institutions in the countries mentioned above. The 
empirical design tests whether demilitarization of internal security affects individuals’ diffusive 
democracy support and police institutions’ specific democratization or, on the contrary, there is 
no effect what so ever. The findings show support for the main hypothesis that individuals from 
countries with more demilitarized police support in greater scale democratic regimes; individuals 
from countries perceived as less corrupted were shown to trust police institutions greater than 
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those from countries more corrupted; finally, individuals that have had any crime interaction, 
whether themselves or through a relative, showed less trust rates in police institutions. 
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BACKGROUND 
The issue and why it matters 
 Analyzing the relationship of citizen security and democratization has great importance 
for many reasons. First, the region has been in constant reformulation of policing institutions 
since its return to democracy. Second, and as mentioned, the high levels of inequality have 
placed Latin America among the most violent regions of the world raising the crime rates in the 
region higher than other great areas of the world, due to issues linked to drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, kidnapping, etc. Lastly, the great connection between democracy and citizen security, 
the rule of law guarantees the observation of human rights, and due process, as an integral part of 
the emergence and institutionalization of democracy (Karstedt and LaFree, 2006). 
 Due to the long military authoritarian regimes that have governed great part of the region 
of this research’s interest, many of the countries inherited militarized police institutions. Among 
the population, there is a common sentiment of approval for the military to take control of 
internal security when exceptional chaos states take place in Latin American countries. Hence, as 
Neild (2003) describes, public confidence in the police and judicial system is constantly 
weakened by the failure to deepen democracy, of the rule of law, and to extend citizenship rights 
across all social sectors, which undermines support for democracy.  
 Many countries in Latin America have implemented Iron-fist policies, where increasing 
penalties and construction of prisons have been the most popular actions. However, these actions 
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have not being as efficient in fighting crime as they were expected to. Part of the literature has 
determined that saturation policing offers a psychological displacement effect of reassurance to 
the population, because of the “10-for-1 rule”, which means that it actually takes ten officers to 
increase the visible presence of the police in a given area (Hinton, 2006). Therefore, the 
outcomes of iron-fist policies have evidenced the need of a closer relationship between the police 
and the community (Arias, Rosada-Granados & Saín, 2012). 
 Citizen Security and Democratization Relationship 
 The relationship between internal security and democracy carries great importance when 
analyzing factors that would improve the levels of democratization in a region relatively and 
recently free. As Karstedt and LaFree (2006) explain, public perception of democracy is highly 
affected by the behavior of the police and other criminal justice agents; these actors are seen as 
the key for the development of strong democracies. 
 Neild (2003) describes that the instrumentalist theory of policing assumes that police 
reflect regimes, and their behavior will come to reflect the new values of democracy once the 
legal framework has been reformed to incorporate those values. The police, as agents of internal 
security, possess coercive capabilities to enforce rule of law. However these capabilities 
highlight the divisive force of the structural tensions in the society. Regardless of the 
differentiation, to the public perception, police is the state on the streets in regards to law and 
order (Hinton, 2006). Furthermore, police performance will directly affect the perception of the 
legal system and ultimately the legitimacy of the state itself. If people have a reasonable degree 
of trust in the state’s institutions, they are more likely to believe that compliance, cooperation, 
and loyalty will best serve their long-term personal interest. The presence of police force on the 
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streets provides the public reassurance of state protection against crime and a sense of safety 
(Hinton, 2006). Hence, with police misconduct, public respect for legality and the legitimacy of 
the state are diminished. 
 The roles of the police in democracy have been long established by the literature. As it 
has been argued so far, police performance will directly affect the public perception of state 
legitimacy, from the symbolic point of view. Therefore, the functions of the police in democracy 
are assistance and reassurance, deterrence capacity, and investigative capacity (Hinton, 2006). 
Assistance and reassurance provide citizens the affirmation that a state of law and a climate of 
justice exist when they can perceive a constant police presence with capacity to intervene in 
insecure states. Deterrence capacity is directly affected by how the criminal element perceives 
the likelihood and severity of punishment for violations of the law. Finally, investigative 
capacity place the police institution as an effective and efficient auxiliary to the judiciary system 
by making arrests and carrying out criminal investigations within legal boundaries (Hinton, 
2006). 
 As features required of the police institutions, accountability and transparency have great 
importance. It is in that spirit that all citizens should be governed by the same set of institutions 
and legal rules; the police should be ruled in advance to performing their service in the streets. 
This would provide a balance between powers of coercion and the legality of their procedures, 
preventing any potential abuse against citizens. 
 The democratization process that took place in Latin America is part of what the 
literature has called Third-wave. As the conditions of the context of the democracy that took 
place in the region were completely different from the first ages of democratization, Latin 
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America has developed what Rose and Shin (1999) call incomplete democracies. As third-wave 
democracies have not been able to reach the complete democracies status yet, and there is no 
evidence that they will be able to do so either, the critics to these countries focus on daily 
violations of the rule of law, corruption and unaccountable government. O’Donnel (2004) states 
that transitioning to democracy entails the construction of institutions intended to ensure 
transparent electoral processes and the construction of institutions intended to promote the rule 
of law and citizens’ basic rights. In addition, as Rose and Shin (1999) have stated, third-wave 
democracies miss basic institutions of the modern states in order to completely develop to full 
democracies; third-wave democracies have started democratization backwards, introducing free 
elections before establishing such basic institutions as the rule of law and civil society. The 
implementation of inadequate internal security policies in Latin America is a perfect example of 
how backwards democratization took place in the region. Great part of the countries focused on 
transitioning to a democratic government without setting the rules and institutions needed to 
protect the new status quo, setting and reforming the new institution as things started to go, 
managing at the same time the public critiques reflected in the new free elections. According to 
Cruz (2011), the transitions can be framed around three types of events: authoritarian breakdown 
through military coups and popular uprisings; the electoral process following the breakdowns; 
and institutional reform aimed to transform the security apparatus. Latin America presents cases 
on each type of those transitions. 
 Citizen Security and Dimensions of Democratic Support 
 While determining the implications of citizen security on individuals’ democratic 
support, it is important to determine what dimension of regime support is the object of this 
inquiry. As Belchior, Teixeira & Tsatsanis (2014) describe the two dimensions of regime support 
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as diffuse support and specific support. The first one, as the authors explain, is related to 
elemental features of the political system, therefore it last long in time since it originates from 
deep-embedded political values and attachments; while specific support is directed to 
performance and outputs of authorities, thus this support is constrained to perceptions and 
evaluations of performance and policy outputs causing swings as citizens perceptions varies. 
 As the testable argument of this research is whether demilitarization of police increases 
individuals’ approval for democracy, it is important to understanding the concept of diffuse 
support for democracy. Belchior, Teixeira & Tsatsanis (2014) describe how diffuse support is 
strongly related to regime capacity as understood by Lipset, which defines it as “the capacity of a 
political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the 
most appropriate and proper ones for the society” (Lipset, 1983, as cited by Belchior, Teixeira & 
Tsatsanis, 2014).  
 Part of the literature has stated that domestic political or economic performance seems to 
have little influence in regards to democracy legitimacy since support for such regime seems to 
be widespread in international community (Easton, 1975). However, Magalhães (2014) suggests 
instead that performance and outputs could greatly affect preferences about regime types for 
individuals. According to Magalhães (2014) government effectiveness is an important factor that 
determines individuals’ diffusive democracy support. He defines effectiveness of government as 
“the quality of policy formulation and implementation”. As Easton (1967) and Lipset (1981) 
established that specific and diffuse support are naturally tied. Carlin, Love and Zechmeister 
(2013) describe that “reservoirs of good will” for diffuse support are built as result of institutions 
and political actors’ sustained high performance, which generates specific support. These 
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reservoirs, according to Carlin, Love and Zechmeister (2013), are utilized by the political system 
when specific support drops temporarily. 
 Since law enforcement is strongly associated as the state in the streets and individuals 
base their democracy approval on their perception of government performance, using law 
enforcement reforms in Latin America should show a strong correlation with diffuse democracy 
support. As Magalhães (2014) states, contentment with the way democracy develops has been 
related with numerous significant characteristics of political performance, including the actual or 
alleged quality of government institutions. 
 Specific support has great importance for this inquiry as well. Individuals’ levels of 
corruption experience from police members and/or levels of victimization could affect specific 
support of the police institution. Individuals’ dissatisfaction with police performance is directly 
related to their perception of the institution which could cause lower rates of specific support in 
regards of the institution. 
 Rates of victimization fluctuate according to peoples’ experience and people’s 
information related to victimization around them. Some countries in Latin America score higher 
level of victimization experience rather than higher level of victimization perception. This 
indirect relationship is also seen in regards of corruption. For instance, Chile has the second 
highest score in the region according to Corruption Index in 2016, while the level of corruption 
experience according to LAPOP is one of the lowest of the region. 
 Militarized police as factor of Citizen Security 
 Keeping in mind that the object of this analysis is Latin America in the context of 
citizen security, this analysis must spend some effort understanding the military factor in internal 
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security. Latin American history, in general, has many gloomy days of military authoritarian 
governance. Although almost all the region is now categorized as free or partially free according 
to the Freedom House, a great part of the police institutions of Latin-American countries carry 
quiet amount of military foundation. Militarization of police institutions is not a problem itself, 
as Neild (2003) explains militarization can provide a sense of discipline to the institution and a 
hierarchical structure that organizes its administration with clear bureaucratic steps. The issue is 
when police, private security or paramilitaries commit abuses and they undermine democracy, 
creating greater violence and jeopardize human rights (Neild, 2003). Furthermore, the long 
history of military dictatorships in Latin America has dyed the memory of citizenship with 
memories of a number of disappearances and human rights abuses. As Hinton (2006) explains, in 
democracy it is expected that the police will use force more sparingly than in a dictatorship, 
where accountability is a rare commodity and impunity tends to be the rule. 
 For the purposes of this research is important to understand the differentiation that the 
literature has settled between militarism and militarization. As Kraska  (2007) discuses 
militarism is the ideology focused on the best means to solve problems based on the use of force 
and threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems; while 
militarization, is the implementation of the ideology through the process of arming, organizing, 
planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict.  
 Kraska (2007) provides dimensions of a military model that offer us tangible indicators 
of police militarization, such as material, cultural, organizational, and operational. The material 
dimension refers to martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology; cultural dimension 
relates to martial language, style (appearance), beliefs, and values; organizational dimension 
refers to martial arrangements such as ‘command and control’ centers, or elite squads of officers 
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patterned after military special operations patrolling high-crime areas; and operational dimension 
are the patterns of activity modeled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence, 
supervision, handling high-risk situations, or warmaking/restoration. Later on, these dimensions 
will have great importance in order to test this paper hypothesis. 
Citizen Security in Latin America 
 Moving forward to the theory of this research’s hypotheses, it is important to establish 
the link between law enforcement militarization and citizen security in the region. The current 
landscape of citizen security in Latin America is deeply connected with the governance and 
institutional structure of government prior to the democratization process. While some countries 
moved forward to democratization sooner than later, all Latin American countries at some point 
were military dictatorships. In the 1960s the region started to walk its way to the democratization 
process that we can see now. In regards of citizen security, Neild (2003) describes that 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy and from war to peace have removed the region’s 
militaries from most government and internal security duties. Before the transitions, the police 
violated human rights with impunity. Then the violations were targeted to political issues, and 
now the violations are aimed at criminal issues.  
 Neild (2003) compares the Latin America authoritarian approach to the one implemented 
during the South African apartheid. He finds that these two approaches shared some common 
principles in regards of policing:  
“the mission of the police is to support the political regime or a particular 
government; police do not require public legitimacy to be effective; police have 
few, if any, accountability mechanism; criminal detection capabilities are weak 
and concentrated in limited areas/constituencies (whites, wealthy neighborhoods 
or business elite); intelligence-gathering structures are focused on enemies of the 
regime rather then gathering criminal intelligence; concentration on policing for 
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political control means that the understanding and practice of crime prevention 
are poorly developed (with little tradition of visible or community policing on 
which to build)”. (South African White Paper 1998, as cited by Neild, 2003). 
 After the dictatorship period, countries in the region kept many of the office personnel in 
their police institutions, transferring the old methods to the new institutions and the new 
personnel.  As Cruz (2011) states, in Central America and in many countries of Latin America, 
the pacts made during the transition and immediately thereafter are conditioned by agents who 
held power. Some of these agents survived the transitions to constitute legal players in the new 
institutional arena, while others did not. With the transitions to democracy, all social sectors 
became affected with the criminal out of control situation which increased the public pressure for 
internal security reforms through the region. Dissatisfaction with police performance creates 
feelings of insecurity in public opinion promoting the support for militarization of police 
institutions. Hinton (2006) states how throughout Latin America, countries still resort to calling 
on military troops whenever the public security situation deteriorates, and occasionally, they do 
so to also repress restless police.  
 As Arias, Rosada-Granados & Saín (2012) inform, given the political impact of levels of 
perceived insecurity, since the 1980s many governments have attempted to carry out institutional 
reform processes of the police which objectives and scope have varied, but in most cases have 
been insufficient to address the real and the perceived security issues. In addition to the poor 
perception of the police performance by the public, many citizens fear that police cannot protect 
them against revenge attacks if they cooperate with criminal investigations (Neild, 2003), which 
decreases the citizenship participation in internal security. Moreover, since in most cases the 
police continue to enjoy impunity, the police continue to use repressive security practices, which 
increase the lack of trust in the institution by the citizens. 
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 According to Arias, Rosada-Granados, and Saín (2012), there are three cases in Latin 
America that the military may--legitimately—participate in internal security: (1) as a last resort 
in critical and exceptional cases; (2) through the promotion of its incorporation to the fight of the 
criminality in full and permanent form; (3) and, when there is a differentiation between police 
functions and the armed forces, constitutional rules on states of emergency are made flexible to 
allow them to participate in the fight against crime, beyond its limits, as determined by political 
authority. In the case that these extensions of competencies are granted by the constitution, the 
extraordinary competences must be clearly delimited and must be temporary, with precise tasks, 
deadlines, and territory.  
 Some common and different features of the Latin American police identified by Arias, 
Rosada-Granados, and Saín (2012) are shown in figure 1: 
 
Distinct 
Features 
Structure, federal countries 
have several police bodies 
among which there is no 
coordination. Centralized 
countries or unitary states have 
a single police force. All these 
bodies are very centralized, 
hierarchical and militarized. 
Functioning, in some countries 
the investigation of crimes is the 
task of judicial police, and 
preventive work is undertaken 
by a different police; In others 
research and prevention are in 
charge of a single body. 
Common Features 
In most countries, sometimes the 
functions overlap and there is not a 
clear differentiation between the police 
forces and the military. 
Lack of public confidence in police 
institutions, people only go to them in 
extreme cases and as a last resort. 
Shortcomings in the selection and training 
of their personnel. 
The police usually do not have 
mechanisms for collecting and analyzing 
information or with management and 
evaluation tools, indispensable for 
efficient decision-making. 
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 The reforms that Latin American countries have attempted to implement after their 
transitions to democracy have been influenced by different reform visions. The most common 
approach that Arias, Rosada-Granados, and Saín (2012) finds is increasing the human, 
operational and infrastructure resources of the institution as it is, without changes in the 
organization and in the police work. Thus, it limits itself to improving or expanding the existing 
police system, its organizational structure, doctrinal bases, functional orientations, equipment 
and infrastructure, personnel, training and training devices and professional careers, without 
regard to police modalities and their impact on the crime or the type of work performed.  
 There are other approaches that can be implemented, visions as changing norms, 
organizational structure, and involving the community, could improve the restructuration of 
police institutions, training process of the personnel, decentralization of the institution, and the 
institution evaluation by public opinion (Arias, Rosada-Granado, and Saín, 2012). Those changes 
combined could greatly improve the institution efficacy and efficiency, any other way would be 
a naïve approach to the required reforms. 
 Latin America context 
 When analyzing the relationship of citizen security and democracy in Latin America, to 
better understand the context of the interaction of these variables is important to take a look at 
different factors such as level of democracy, public corruption perception, cost of violence, and 
police personnel per 1,000 habitants. 
 Freedom House develops a freedom rating based on political rights and civil liberties. 
The scale goes from 1 to 7, where 1 is most free and 7 is least free. In the following graph, we 
can see the 18 traditional Latin American countries object of academic research for the years 
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2002, 2010, and 2016. Chile and Uruguay have the lowest scores of the region, while Venezuela 
is the least free country. The mean score for the region during those periods of time is 2.6. In 
2016, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Paraguay are considered partly free countries. The rest of countries of the region are considered 
free.    
 
 The following table shows the cost of crime and violence as a percentage of GDP for 
Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay for 2010. The table shows quite a 
difference between the values of the selected countries; they range from 3 percent in Chile and 
Uruguay, up to over 10 percent in Honduras. 
Cost of crime and violence as a percentage of GDP, selected countries, 2010 
Type of cost Chile Costa Rica Honduras Paraguay Uruguay 
As 
anticipation 
of crime 
0.71 0.34 1.50 0.72 0.49 
As 
consequence 
of crime 
2.11 1.47 8.01 6.26 1.22 
As a 
response to 
0.50 0.71 1.03 1.72 1.29 
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crime 
Cost of 
crime and 
violence 
3.32 2.52 10.54 8.70 3 
Source: Based on the Cost of Crime and Violence, IADB-UNDP (2013)(UNDP Regional Report, 2013-14) 
 
 Another illustrative factor worth considering is the Perception Corruption Index from the 
Transparency International. This index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption 
worldwide. The following graph shows the 18 traditional Latin American countries object of 
academic research for the years 2002, 2010, and 2016. Chile and Uruguay have the highest 
scores, while Venezuela is the most corrupt perceived country in the region; the mean score is 
3.5. 
  
 The Organization of American States (OAS) collects data in regards to police presence in 
Latina American countries. The police personnel rate per 100,000 inhabitants only considers 
personnel in public agencies as of December 31, whose principal functions are prevention, 
detection and investigation of crime and apprehension of alleged offenders. Support staff as 
secretaries, clerks, etc. are excluded from this account.   
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 The following graph shows 2007 and 2010 police personnel rate. As in the last 
descriptive factors provided above, the main objects of focus are the same eighteen countries. 
However, OAS does not provide data for Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela for those years. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that Uruguay has the highest police personnel in the 
region exceeding the 500 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants at least since 2003.  
 
 These indicators provide an overview of the situation of the countries study in this 
research in comparison with the rest of the region. Chile is the out layer among the countries 
chose for this analysis in regards of Freedom House index and Corruption Perception index. The 
geographic location of El Salvador and Mexico explains some of the similar social and internal 
issues, as drug cartels, human trafficking and proliferation of gangs. 
   
 
 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
2007 
2010 
 18 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 The argument to be examined here is that demilitarization of law enforcement increases 
diffuse democratic support. Considering that transition and the history of democracies in Latin 
America are strongly related with the role of military forces in governmental administration, it is 
expected that countries that have clearly separated internal and external security functions in two 
different institutions have higher diffusive democracy support. Therefore, countries with less 
militarized law enforcement should show higher levels of diffuse democratization approval by 
individuals. 
 (H1) Countries with less militarized law enforcement show higher levels of diffuse 
democratization approval by individuals. 
 On the other hand, specific support towards police will be greatly affected by individuals’ 
victimization perception. Whether individuals have been victims of crime and how the police 
procedures after the event developed could have a great effect on individuals’ efficiency 
perception on the institution. If individuals feel unsafe on the daily basis, added to the lack of 
protection mechanisms their satisfaction with law enforcement and the rule of law in the country 
may have negative consequences for police specific support. Therefore, individuals that 
expressed higher level of victimization show lower levels of specific democratization approval. 
 (H2) Higher levels of victimization should lead to lower specific support of police 
institutions. 
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 Lastly, individuals that have interacted with police officers and that have experienced 
bribery requests for officer to performance their job or—to the contrary—to get away with legal 
fines may express lower level of specific support for citizen security institutions. If individuals 
perceive law enforcement as a corrupt institution their trust in the institution may be affected 
negatively, and the belief that they may need to be ready to protect themselves may diminish 
their specific support for the institution. Therefore, individuals from lower corruption perception 
rates countries show higher levels of specific democratization approval. 
 (H3) Higher levels of corruption perception in the country should lead to lower specific 
support for police institutions. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Militarization coding 
 Despite demilitarization of police enforcement is a common vision in Latin America, for 
the inquiry purposes, the countries object of analysis are Chile, Argentina, El Salvador and 
Mexico. As Kraska (1999) explains, the analysis of demilitarization of law enforcement police 
should center its effort on what level does civilian police fall on a continuum—culturally, 
organizationally, operationally, and materially—and in what direction they are currently headed. 
  Based on Kraska (2007) dimensions military model, material, cultural, organizational, 
and operational the demilitarization scale will be applied to code demilitarization. The material 
dimension refers to the extent of martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology; 
cultural dimension relates to the extent of martial language, style (appearance), beliefs, and 
values; organizational dimension refers to the extent of martial arrangements such as ‘command 
and control’ centers, or elite squads of officers patterned after military special operations 
patrolling high-crime areas; and operational dimension are the extent of operational patterns of 
activity modeled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence, supervision, handling 
high-risk situations, or warmaking/restoration. To test the above hypotheses and based on Kaskra 
(2007) militarization coding, a scale 1-4 will be applied to Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and 
Mexico police institution as follows:  
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Material:  
 1 to 4 from very low weaponry military materials, as 9mm, to 4 heavy military 
materials, as rifles and grenades; 2 would be define on whether agents are authorized 
to use fire weapons during protests or marches. This category also accounts for the 
extent of military control vehicles capacity such as control vehicles with water or CS 
cannon, or in the contrary the usage of horses for riot control. 
 Cultural:  
 1 to 4 from casual attire to military-styled uniforms to police man wearing bullet proof 
vests and helmets on regular basis. This category also accounts for the extent of military 
beliefs and values in the institution’s mission. The description of the institution, mission 
and vision provide a great weight to the coding for the countries, therefore institutions 
that define itself as a civil organization will rank below 2, whether institutions that 
describe itself as a military institution will rank above 2. 
Organizational:  
 1 to 4 from completely civilian organization to normalized use of elite squads of officers 
patterned after military special operations team. This category accounts for whether 
police belongs to the Ministry or Department of Defense or to another institution; it also 
accounts if agents in service that abuse human rights or commit a crime are judge by 
military justice courts or by civil courts, the first will rank above 2 in the scale. 
Operational:  
 1 to 4 from civilian oriented operations to highly operational patterns modeled after the 
military for intelligence gathering, supervision, handling high-risk situations, and highly 
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aggressive and punitive operations such as some zero-tolerance initiatives. Such 
institutions that conduct highly intelligence operations will rank closer to 4. 
 
Country militarization analysis  
Argentina 
 The Constitutional Act of the Federal Police enacted on 1958, establishes that the 
Federal Police performs functions of Security and Judicial Police—provides services to the 
judiciary and public ministry, for investigation of crimes and execution of sentences—in the 
territory of the Provinces and Capital of the Nation, within the jurisdiction of the Government of 
the Nation. The Federal Police depends on the National Executive Branch, through the Ministry 
of Security. This act also establishes the hierarchical scale of range, modes of classification, 
promotion protocol, tenure, command and succession of command. There are two levels of 
police forces: those of federal jurisdiction and those belonging to each of the twenty-three 
provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. Police officers who report crimes during 
their service are tried by the Criminal Oral Courts (Smink, 2009).   
 The Argentinean Federal Police has the local police divisions also: Security Police 
(they are those that are in the street), Police Motorized (patrols streets and avenues of the city 
with motorcycles last generation and four wheelers), the DOUCAD (Division of Urban 
Operations of Containment and Activities Sports), the CGI (Infantry Guard Corps), the GOM 
(Motorized Operative Group) and the PM (Mounted Police), which are all units specialized in 
riot control. Policy implemented since 2004 that the troops do not act with firearms in the control 
of marches and claims (Ámbito, 2010).   
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 The current General Regulation of the Argentinean Federal Police Number 10 about 
Uniforms, Uniforms and Attributes, was approved in 1996. Such bylaws establish every detail of 
the uniform from the lowest to the highest range. The Rules define the uniform that law 
enforcement officers must wear for parades, social events, daily basis, on duty and training. The 
bylaws also specify the range distinctive. 
 The Constitutional Act of Federal Police established the hierarchical scale of range, 
modes of classification, promotion protocol, tenure, command and succession of command. The 
Federal Police has a special operations division, the Federal Operations Task Force (GEOF), 
which is charged with conducting counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics missions, as well as 
the rescue of hostages and protection of heads of state visiting the country.  
 The G.E.O.F have machine guns Minimi Saw M249, Belgian manufacture, able to load 
250 caliber 5.56 bullets in a cassette charger. In addition, the troops wear SIZ assault rifles .223 
caliber, with 30 ammunition loaders; and helmets with cameras and hearing protectors. The GE-
1 group, meanwhile, has Remington 308 caliber rifles and British-made CG rifles. Street officers 
utilize 9 mm (Mendoza Post, 2017). 
 Argentinean Federal Police uses Focus II and Ranger units, armored and equipped with 
communication and image recording technology, to patrol (Autoblog, 2013); and uses water 
cannon in protests and marches (Ámbito, 2010). 
 According with the description above, Argentinean Federal Police score in Kaskra 
(2007) militarization coding 1-4 scale: Material 2.7; Cultural 2; Organizational 2.7; and 
Operational 2.7. Averaging a total score of 2.5.   
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Chile 
 Citizen security labors are in charge of different institutions in Chile. Polícia de 
Investigaciones is in charge of assisting the Judicial system to solve investigations in order to 
determine presence of crime and authorship; while Seguridad Ciudadana is charge of assisting 
municipal security through supporting Carabineros de Chile. Although these two institutions are 
highly recognized by the community, citizens’ perception of national citizen security are 
exclusively link to Carabineros de Chile, therefore this analysis only focuses on individuals 
perceptions in regards of such institution. 
  The Constitutional Act of the Carabineros establishes that Carabineros de Chile is a 
military and technical police institution, which integrates the public force and exists to give 
effectiveness to the law; its purpose is to guarantee and maintain public order and internal public 
security throughout the territory of the Republic and fulfill the other functions entrusted to it by 
the Constitution and the law. This act also established the hierarchical scale of range, modes of 
calcification, promotion protocol, tenure, command and succession of command. 
 Since 2011 Carabineros of Chile depends directly on the Ministry of Interior and Public 
Security and is administratively linked with it through the Undersecretariat of the Interior. 
Carabineros of Chile is an armed police force is essentially obedient, non-deliberative, 
professional, hierarchical and disciplined and its personnel is subjected to the basic rules 
established in such organic law, its Statute, Military Justice Code and internal regulations 
(Ministerio Nacional de Defensa, Gobierno de Chile). 
 The Constitutional Act of Carabineros of Chile established the existence of Grupo de 
Operaciones Policiales Especiales (Police Special Operations Group, GOPE), which is a special 
force of military uniformed police that carry out high-risk police operations throughout the 
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country, including bomb disposal, location and tracking of bombs and explosives, rescuing 
people or bodies from places of difficult access, anti-crime raids and clashes.  
 The current Uniform Rules and Equipment for Appointment Staff Institutional of 
Carabineros de Chile was approved by de facto president Augusto Pinochet Hiriat in February 
15, 1980. Such bylaws establish every detail of the uniform from the lowest to the highest range. 
The Rules define the uniform that law enforcement officers must wear for parades, social events, 
daily basis, on duty and training. The bylaws also specify the range distinctive.  
 In the case of Chile FAMAE (Fábricas y Maestranzas del Ejército) is in charge of 
providing weapons to Carabineros police force. FAMAE is a Chilean state-owned firearms 
manufacturer, which is part of the national army. Carabineros officers carry 9mm guns when in 
duty along with handcuffs and baton, and drive Dodge Charger Police Interceptor for regular 
patrol (Carvallo, 2014), while for protests and marches they use Panhard-branded Renault 
armored vehicles that have state-of-the-art technology and each weighs five tons as shooting tear 
gas and water cannons (Martínez, 2014; RT, 2015). 
 As a modernization process, Carabineros has increased its technological resources in 
the various units it owns. Carabineros has the most advanced digital radio system in Latin 
America, called SmartZone. The institution also has the AUPOL (police automation) system, 
which allows each police unit to be equipped computationally and connected nationally. Some of 
the technologies that Carabineros possess are stereoscopic magnifying glass, ultraviolet light, 
Alcotest (breathzalyzers), off-road motorcycles, ambulance aircraft equipped with resuscitation 
and first aid instruments, Helicopter BK 117, Global Position System (GPS), mobile computers, 
Autovelox (speed pistol), and surveillance cameras (Icarito).  
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 According with the description above, Carabineros de Chile Police score in 
militarization coding 1-4 scale: Material 2.7; Cultural 2.3; Organizational 3.3; and Operational 3. 
Averaging a total score of 2.8. 
El Salvador 
 The Policia Nacional Civil (PNC) of El Salvador is an established civilian police 
institution which mission is to guarantee the free exercise of the Rights and Freedoms of the 
people, security, tranquility and order, preventing and repressing crime, with strict respect for 
human rights, integrating personnel commitment and the participation of the population, 
contributing to the Promotion of the rule of law and integral development of the country. 
 The Decree number 82, Regulation Of The Law Organization Of The National Civil 
Police of El Salvador in its Art. 4 establishes that the organizational structure of the PNC will be 
conformed by: The General Directorate, of whom The General Subdirectorate, the 
Subdirectorates, the General Inspectorate, the Technical Council, the Center for Police 
Intelligence, the Internal Audit Unit and the Courts. The PNC divisions are: Division of 
Environment Joint, Public Security Command Division, Mounted Police Division, and Rural 
Police Regional Division. Police officers who report crimes during their service are tried by the 
Criminal Oral Courts (Cáceres, 2017). 
 The Special Police Operations Group was created in 2013 and is composed of more than 
thirty elements of the different units: Rural Police, Finance Division, Intelligence Center, Police 
Reaction Group (GRP) and Operational Tactical Unit (UTO), among others. The surveillance, 
capture and follow-up of criminals are the main functions that have been delegated to the Group 
of Special Police Operations (GOPES) (Ortiz, 2006). The elements have been instructed in 
assault technique with long weapons and short weapons.  
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 Although the PNC have made efforts to modernize its equipment, its material resources 
are still quite limited. During patrol activities officers use off-road vehicles, bullet-proof vests, 
9mm guns, while for protests and marches police agents use tear gas and rubber bullets. Some of 
the highlights of technologies that PNC posses are a modern 911 emergency system, video 
cameras in public places, an automated fingerprint system and a laboratory for DNA analysis 
(Diario1, 2015; Marroquín, 2008). The institutions also possess Sig Sauer pistols and chargers.  
 According with the description above, Policia Nacional Civil of El Salvador scored in 
militarization coding 1-4 scale for 2007, 2009 and 2011: Material 1.7; Cultural 1; Organizational 
1.7; and Operational 1.7. Averaging a total score of 1.5. While for the years 2013 and 2015 the 
PNC of El Salvador scored: Material 2; Cultural 1; Organizational 2; and Operational 2. 
Mexico 
 The Federal Police Law in its Article 2 establishes that the Federal Police of Mexico is 
a decentralized administrative body of the Ministry of Public Security. The Police institution 
apply and operate the public security policy in the area of crime prevention and combat, in 
addition to investigating the commission of crimes under the leadership and command of the 
Public Ministry of the Federation. According to Art. 5 the divisions of the institutions are 
Intelligence, Research, Regional Security, Scientific, Anti-drugs, and Federal Forces (DOF, 
2009). Police officers who report crimes during their service are tried by the Federal Criminal 
Procedure District Court (Meceda, 2012). 
 The Special Operations Group, also known as GEO, is a special operations unit of the 
Federal Police of Mexico. They perform a great variety of operations among which stand out; 
The rescue of hostages, the apprehension of highly dangerous criminals, counter-narcotics 
actions, counter-terrorism and the fight against organized crime. Its members have been trained 
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by the Aeromóvil Group of Special Forces of the Army and the Brigade of Parachutist Fusiliers 
of the Navy of Mexico, the GEO of Spain, the AFEUR of Colombia, the RAID of France and the 
FAMS of the United States (Merino). 
 Federal Police uniforms are regulated by the Manual of Uniforms and Currencies of 
The Federal Preventive Police which specifically prescribes that police agents must wear bullet 
proof vests and boots, while there material equipments show the military orientation of the 
institution (Manual de uniformes y divisas de la Policía Federal preventive, 2008). Although the 
patrol transportation includes Chevrolet Suburban, Toyota Hilux, Nissan Tiida, Nissan Tsuru, 
and Dodge Charger; for special operations against organized crime and high-impact crime the 
police uses Ballistic Armored Tactical Transport; for transporting dogs that are experts in the 
detection of narcotics, explosives and human remains, and that are strategic in research the 
institution uses Van Express vans; and  for the Directorate of Special Services for Security and 
Protection of Persons agents assigned to the security of officials, judges, witnesses and victims 
use Armored Suburban; In addition, trucks rinos and arms Galil and Colt (Riestra, 2015). 
 In regards to weapons use by the Federal Police of Mexico, the institution possess 
pistols, submachine guns, assault rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, shotguns, and grenade 
launchers. 
  According with the description above, the Policía Federal de Mexico scores in 
militarization coding 1-4 scale: Material 3.7; Cultural 3; Organizational 3.7; and Operational 3.7. 
Averaging a total score of 3.5. 
 The following graph shows Demilitarization average scores for each country. 
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Empirical Design 
 In order to test the hypotheses, the unit of analysis is individual-year for the years of 
2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 for surveys collected in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and 
Mexico by Latinobarometro. The time frame for this analysis is to consider the last ten years in 
those countries where the political landscape have changed from left to right indistinctly. 
Argentina switched to a right wing president after decades of left wings administration during a 
deep economic crisis; while Chile went back and forth from left to right and back to left wing 
administration for the first time since its return to democracy. El Salvador started to face the 
largest migration crisis in the country due to public security issues in its history; while Mexico 
flipped back the administration coin after twelve years of PAN administration with a high rate of 
public insecurity and organized crime. The importance of my unit of analysis is that accounts for 
the variation of diverse countries of Latin America.  
 Testing the hypotheses required three different multivariate OLS regression models with 
the following variables: 
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Dependent Variable 
 Hypothesis 1 tests whether or not the level of diffuse democracy support varies across 
individual-year when accounting for demilitarization level. To test this hypothesis, a created 
combined variable, Democracy Support, accounts from Latinobarometro questions: (A) With 
which of the following statements do you agree most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind 
of government (1); Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable 
to a democratic one (-1); and, For people like me, it doesn’t matter whether we have a 
democratic or non-democratic regime (0); (B) In general, would you say you are very satisfied, 
quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the working of the democracy in 
(country)? Very satisfied (4), Quite satisfied (3), Not very satisfied (2); and, Not at all satisfied 
(1); and, (C) Do you strongly agree (4), agree (3), disagree (2) or strongly disagree (1) with the 
following statement? Democracy may have problems but it is the best system of government. 
 Hypothesis 2 tests whether or not the level of specific democracy support for police 
institutions varies across individual-year when accounting for victimization level; while 
hypothesis 3 tests whether or not the level of specific democracy support for police institutions 
varies across individual-year when accounting for corruption perception. To test these 
hypotheses, a variable—Trust in Police—from Latinobarometro question is used: Please look at 
this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. 
Would you say you have a lot (4), some (3), a little (2) or no trust (1)? Police. 
 Coding values for Latinobarometro questions were modified in order for results to have 
logic understanding for dependent variables and independent variables. 
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Independent Variables 
 The main hypothesis, H(1) uses Demilitarization as independent variable. This variable 
uses militarization average scores values described previously in this inquire. For logic 
understanding of the results the values have been inverted. 
 For H(2), a created combined variable, Victimization, accounts from Latinobarometro 
questions: (A) How often are you concerned that you could be a victim of a violent crime? 
Almost all the time (4), Sometimes (3), Occasionally (2), or Never (1); and, (B) Have you (1) or 
a relative (2) been assaulted, attacked, or the victim of a crime in the last 12 months? The values 
of the latter question were modified to dichotomous, in which if the respondent or a relative 
experience a crime it was assigned value one (1), if for the contrary, the respondent nor a relative 
experience a crime it was assigned value zero (0). 
 The independent variable for H(3) is Corruption Perception Index value. Corruption  
Perception Index is a score of how corrupt countries’ public sectors are seen to be, it captures the 
informed views of analysts, businesspeople and experts in countries around the world. Score 
values are 1-10, 1 been most corrupt and 10 been less corrupt. 
   Control Variables 
 When testing for democracy support it is inevitable to control for democracy level, to do 
such Freedom House index—Freedom House—is the most accurate score to use. The index 
accounts for political rights and civil liberties. Values go from 1, being the best, to 7, being the 
worst. For logic understanding of the results score values have been inversed. 
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 GDP per capita is controlled in order to account for the economic situation of the home 
country of the respondents. Values were retrieved from the Inter American Development Bank 
data base, which does not have the value for 2015 for El Salvador. To maintain the increase 
value trend, an average of the difference between 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013 was added to the 
2013 value and assigned to 2015. 
 Considering the indigenous conflicts in Latin American countries, indigenous is a 
dichotomous variable that accounts for individuals self identify as indigenous. In addition, a 
socioeconomic level variable accounts for respondents’ economic status; this variable is based on 
the survey interviewer assessment at the end of the interview. The last control variable is age. 
Models look as it follows: 
Model 1: 
Diffuse Democracy Support = ϒ0 + ϒ1 Demilitarization + ϒ2 CPI + ϒ3 Freedom House  
    + ϒ4 GDP per capita + ϒ5 Ethnicity+ ϒ6 Age + ϒ7 Socioeconomic  
    Level + ᴣ 
Model 2.a: 
Specific Democracy Support = ϒ0 + ϒ1 Victimization+ ϒ2 demilitariation + ϒ3 Freedom House  
    + ϒ4 GDP per capita + ϒ5 Ethnicity + ϒ6 Age + ϒ7 Socioeconomic 
    Level + ᴣ 
Model 2.b: 
Specific Democracy Support = ϒ0 + ϒ1 CPI + ϒ2 demilitarization + ϒ3 Freedom House   
    + ϒ4 GDP per capita + ϒ5 Ethnicity  + ϒ6 Age  
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    + ϒ7 Socioeconomic Level + ᴣ 
Model 2.c: 
Specific Democracy Support = ϒ0 + ϒ1 demilitarization + ϒ2 Freedom House   
    + ϒ3 GDP per capita + ϒ4 Ethnicity  + ϒ5 Age  
    + ϒ6 Socioeconomic Level + ᴣ 
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RESULTS 
 Table 1 indicates the findings in regards of hypothesis 1. As it shows, the raw coefficient 
of diffuse democracy support is 3.155 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding 
demilitarization and the rest of my control variables, there is a .245 effect on democracy support 
at p-value of 0.01 of statistical significance. Most control variables do not show statistically 
significant results, Corruption Perception Index showed a negative correlation of -.078, while 
Freedom House score showed a positive relationship of 0.243. GDP per capita is the only control 
variable with statistical significant results although it stays constant. These results support 
hypothesis 1, showing that individuals from more demilitarized countries support in greater 
levels democratic regimes than individual from more militarized countries. 
Table 1 
 Democracy Support 
Demilitarization 0.245 
 (0.042)** 
Corruption Perception Index -0.078 
 (0.054) 
Freedom House 0.243 
 (0.191) 
GDP per capita 0.000 
 (0.000)* 
Indigenous -0.164 
 (0.071) 
Age 0.002 
 (0.001) 
Socioeconomic Level 0.115 
 (0.054) 
Constant 3.155 
 (0.204)** 
R
2
 0.10 
N 16,820 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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 Table 2 indicates the findings in regards to hypotheses 2 and 3. Model 2.a shows the 
relationship between individuals’ trust in police and victimization; Model 2.b shows the 
relationship between individuals’ trust in police and Corruption Perception Index; while Model 
2.c, shows the relationship between individuals’ trust in police and demilitarization without 
accounting for neither victimization nor Corruption Perception Index. 
  As Model 2.a shows, the raw coefficient of specific democracy support for police 
institutions is 1.923 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding victimization and the rest 
of the control variables, there is a -.186 effect on trust in police at p-value of 0.01 of statistical 
significance. The control variable that obtained a statistical significance of 0.01 is Freedom 
House index, which shows a positive relation of .525. Although the rest of the variables do not 
show statistical significance, GDP per capita remains constant, while  indigenous status shows a 
negative relation in regards of trust in police. 
 Model 2.b shows a raw coefficient of specific democracy support for police institutions 
of 1.3667 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding Corruption Perception index and the 
rest of the control variables, there is a 0.093 effect on trust in police with not statistical 
significant p-value. Control variables did not show statistical significant results, however their 
trend remains the same that in model 1. 
 Model 2.c shows a very similar result in regards of demilitarization effect on trust in 
police that in Model 1, again without statistical significance. The raw coefficient of specific 
democracy support for police institutions is 1.629 with statistical significance of 0.01. When 
adding demilitarization and the rest of the control variables, there is a -.051 effect on trust in 
police. The control variable that obtained a statistical significance of 0.01 is Freedom House 
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index, which shows a positive relation of .541. Although the rest of the variables do not show 
statistical significance, GDP per capita remains constant, while indigenous status shows a 
negative relation in regards of trust in police. 
  These results do not support hypothesis 2, showing that individuals that either experience 
crime or fear of been victims of crime trust less police institutions than those with no 
victimization relation. However, these results support hypothesis 3, showing that countries that 
are perceived as less corrupted also show a positive effect on individuals trust towards police 
institutions. In regards of the main independent variable of this inquire, demilitarization, 
although the results are not statistically significant the results show that higher level of 
demilitarization affect negatively individuals’ trust in police. 
Table 2. Trust in Police 
 Model 2.a Model 2.b Model 2.c 
Victimization -0.186   
 (0.040)*   
Corruption Perception Index  0.093  
  (0.031)  
Demilitarization -0.050 -0.003 -0.051 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.021) 
Freedom House 0.525 0.258 0.541 
 (0.058)** (0.120) (0.050)** 
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) 
Indigenous -0.030 -0.048 -0.036 
 (0.042) (0.028) (0.039) 
Age 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Socioeconomic Level 0.041 0.045 0.038 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) 
Constant 1.923 1.367 1.629 
 (0.160)** (0.172)** (0.123)** 
R
2
 0.11 0.11 0.10 
N 16,820 16,820 16,820 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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 Correlation and Principal Components/Correlation test were performed. Democracy 
support variables added to create the combined variable diffuse democracy support for model 1 
showed they were not highly correlated. Principal Components/Correlation test showed good 
scale of reliability.  
 In addition to the test described above, is important to note that control for year is omitted 
from the report. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 The citizen security reforms implemented in the Latin American region since its return to 
democracy have contributed to the stability of the regime. However, security issues are all over 
the region. Indigenous conflicts in Chile and Argentina keep increasing the intensity of clashes 
among citizens and police personnel, getting to the point of boosting the international community 
concern in regards the conflict. In addition, organized crime and drug cartels in Central America 
do not give law enforcement a break jeopardizing internal security to extremes where civilians 
are forced to request asylum in other countries in order to live in peace.   
 The relationship between democratization and citizen security has long been established 
by the literature. As Neild (2003) and (Hinton, 2006) describe, law enforcement directly affect 
people’s perceptions of the regime and the State perception. As individuals interact with police 
agents on a regular basis, their communication and satisfaction with police institutions will have 
a natural effect in people’s support for the regime. As this inquiry looked to answer questions 
such as how does performance and development of citizen security reforms in Latin America 
contribute to the democratization process in the region? Do the new reforms in the Latin 
America and the transition to demilitarization of law enforcement in the region really contribute 
to citizens’ positive sentiment towards democratization of their country? Does demilitarization of 
citizen security lead to higher democracy levels in Latin America? The development of the 
empirical showed great insights to be considered. 
 
 39 
 
 The main argument examined here is that demilitarization of law enforcement increases 
diffuse democratic support. As mentioned before, the role of military forces in governmental 
administration in Latin America are strongly related with transition and history of democracies in 
the region, therefore countries that have divided internal and external security functions in two 
different institutions have higher diffusive democracy support from individuals. The empirical 
results showed that individuals from more demilitarized countries support in greater levels 
democratic regimes than individual from more militarized countries. 
 In regards to specific support towards police, the results found that is affected by 
individuals’ victimization perception in the opposite direction that the hypothesis anticipated. 
The fear/ worry of becoming crime victim or the experience of having been a victim has a great 
effect on individuals’ trust on the institution in a negative way. Individuals that feel unsafe on a 
daily basis and perceive lack of protection mechanisms see their satisfaction with law 
enforcement and the rule of law agents in the country affected negatively for police specific 
support. The results from the model shows that individuals that either experience crime or fear of 
being victims of crime trust less police institutions than those with no victimization relation. 
These results imply that further analysis need to be done; however, interaction with police in 
drug trafficking areas where corruption could take place in higher scales could decrease effective 
performance of police, decreasing at the same time trust in the institution. 
 Finally, police interaction and media coverage affect corruption perception of individuals 
in regards of public institutions. As the third hypothesis speculated, better rates of corruption 
perception would affect positively specific support for democratization of police institutions, the 
empirical results supported the theory. Individuals from countries with lower rates of corruption 
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perception showed higher trust rates on police institutions, showing higher specific support rates 
for law enforcement institutions. 
 In addition, is important to highlight that demilitarization rates showed negative effect on 
individuals’ trust on police. Although those results are not statistically significant, the possibility 
of individuals trusting police enforcement greatly when the institutions are more militarized 
suggest that further analysis is needed to understand the relationship between demilitarization 
and specific support for law enforcement institutions. Understanding this relationship would 
provide fundamental information to law making agents that seek to endure diffusive support for 
democracy. 
 This research provides great insights to understand how democratization is affected by 
police role in internal security. As Marenin (1996), Cruz (2011), and (Karstedt and LaFree 2006) 
established, new regimes need at least minimal levels of security and order, all these within the 
context of protecting human rights; due to security and justice institutions are fundamental in the 
development of democratic governance. As this is the first empirical measurement of law 
enforcement demilitarization for countries in Latin America, the new spectrum of analysis 
invites researches interested in the region to expand the analysis to other countries and see if the 
results are a generalizable trend throughout the total region. 
 Modernization of technologies in police institutions is necessary to address internal 
security issues; as GDP increases throughout the region the resources implemented in police 
institutions rise as well. Rather than limiting the material resources of law enforcement, the 
institutions and governors must pay great attention to cultural and operational factors that rule 
police performance in order to promote a positive trend to democratization stability. Otherwise 
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international institutions such as International Amnesty, Freedom House and Transparency 
International will continue to express their concern in regards of human rights protection and 
regime violations.  
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